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Strategic Management for 
Mine Action Operations: 
A Case for Government-Industry Partnering 
by Dr. Alan Childress and Lieutenant Colonel Pete Owen 
Summary 
Directed mainly ar policy makers and 
leaders in mine-plagued nations and govern-
ment and non-government mine action 
planners, the article argues for holistic mine 
action strategies, coordinated priorities, and 
best management pract ices. The authors 
establish the need for nations ro rake charge 
of their mine action organizations and 
present strategic management methodology 
to implement self-determination concepts. 
T hey insist rhar humanitarian demining 
must starr with rhe end in mind, an inte-
grated and nationally prioritized require-
ments analysis of each of the mine action 
areas-mine awareness, mine field assess-
ment and surveys, mine and UXO clear-
ance, victim assistance and information 
management. They also suggest rhat nations 
should consider reconstruction and devel-
opment programs, as well as mine action, 
when contemplating resource mobilization. 
With nationally prioritized programs, and 
mine action centers managed by host na-
tion -dedicated general managers, nation's 
can ex peer ro achieve optimum resource al-
location and, most importantly, to look af-
ter their people as a first priority. The 
author's recommend that nations look to 
industry for dedicated, first tier mine action 
program managers. 
l.lntroduction 
By way of introduction we relate Andy 
Smith's description of the beginning of a 
typical humanitarian demining effort. Ar 
present, Smith writes in rhe O ctobe r 1998 
journal of Humanitarian Demining, hu-
manitarian demining in most affected areas 
begins wirh a U.N.-led emergency response, 
which is controlled by ex-pars, who usually 
have a military background and who are 
largely paid for by 'ear-marked' donations 
from U.N. countries. Ar rhe same time, as 
rhe U.N. arrives, the specialist charitably-
funded clearance groups, which are funded 
by an individual government's aid budget or 
by trusts and donor charit ies, rend to move 
into the area. Following rhe charitable 
groups come rhe commerc ial companies, 
some of rhem regionally based, while oth-
ers may appear regionally based bur are ac-
rually initiated by profit-raking outsiders. 
Further, while a few new charitably funded 
demining groups still exist, most of the new 
players are commercial companies. For ex-
ample, with the massive funding available 
for work in rhe former Yugoslavia, European 
groups are anxious ro get involved and new 
allegiances and companies arise weekly. 
Our point in relating Smith's scenario 
is to highl ight rhe apparent lack of holistic 
strategic planning and management pro-
cesses rhar would help coordinate and man-
age scarce h umanitarian demining re-
sources. While planners and resource sup-
pliers have increased dramatically since rhe 
early-90s, we find no apparent correspond-
ing management strategies to coordinate 
those planners' and suppliers' intentions. 
Humanitarian demining documents suggest 
that governments, non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), and other donor orga-
nizations have entered the demining equa-
tion without a n integrating plan to help 
synergize their donated resources and have 
become immune ro rhe cry for help. Our 
experience in humanitarian demining, com-
bined with our research of the humanitar-
ian demining management and technology 
li terature, reveals that the humanitarian 
demining industry's customers, the 70 or so 
mine-plagued nations, would benefit greatly 
from a general model, a process, to strate-
gically manage their humanitarian demin-
ing efforts. In general, our paper is addressed 
to the leaders of those mine-infested na-
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tions, calling on them to establish clear pri-
orities in relation to the needs of their af-
fected people and to manage the accom-
plishmenc of those priorities with the most 
sophisticated management practices they 
can summon. 
2. Literature Review 
According to several humanitarian-
demining sources, landmine clearance will 
require decades of organized, deliberate, and 
rime-consuming effort. Srudies reveal that 
60-100 million land mines lay abandoned in 
at least 70 countries around rhe world and 
landm ines arc responsible for killing or 
maiming an estimated 500 people each 
week. Hidden Killers 1998: The Global 
Landmine Crisis reports the cost ro remove 
one land mine averages from $300 to $1,000 
and the cost for surgical care and fitting of 
an artificial limb is $3,000 or more per 
amputee in some countries. An additional 
problem, Hidden Killers 1998 continues, is 
rhe long-rerm effect on people and their 
environment. Landmines stand in the way 
of efforts ro restore war-torn societies to 
normal life. They consume billions of dol-
lars of assistance that could be used to bring 
prosperity and reconciliation, impacting vir-
tually every aspect of life in the mine-af-
fected countries and on the international 
community as ir seeks effective ways to help 
those countries. Hidden Killers 1998 con-
cludes, in part, that rhc landmine crises can 
be successfully overcome, if the countries 
suffering mine pollution are determined to 
tackle the problem, and if the international 
community can sustain and coordinate its in-
vestment (italics ours) in eradicating the 
landmine plague. 
In addition to Hidden Killers 1998, we 
found several writers who stress the need for 
a comprehensive management approach to 
mine action operations. We briefly eire rhe 
more adamant writers below. Note that we 
replace humanitarian demining with mine 
action, which refers to all those activities 
that address the problems faced by popula-
tions as a resu lt of landmine pollmion. 
Retired Ambassador Roberr Oakley et 
al., arguing in a Los Angeles Times arricle 
that international dem ining planners need 
to develop a comprehensive demining strat-
egy, suggest rhar rhe international commu-
nity must begin working together now to 
develop an integrated approach to humani-
tarian demining. They asserr rhat all com-
ponents of mine action-mine awareness, 
mine assessment and survey, mine and UXO 
clearance, and victim assistance-should be 
integral pans of any comprehensive inter-
national demining operation , stating that 
these initial steps were not taken in Bosnia. 
International companies, local contractors 
and local forces tackled the larger Bosnian 
mine problem and they are still at work to-
day, competing for funding and influencing 
priorities. Oakley er al. claim this lack of a 
comprehensive master plan has exacted a 
high price-human suffering remains, and 
economic ompur is still less rhan half irs 
1990 figure. 
They furrher claim, regarding Kosovo, 
rhar despite the widespread belief that mine 
clearance is an integral part of post-confl ict 
peace-building, economic revitalization and 
sustainable development, there is no agreed 
model for addressing or even coordinating 
these different needs and roles. They con-
clude rhar to be effective, international mine 
action planners must develop a comprehen-
sive strategy now. Otherwise, the "fightin g 
may cease, bur the casualties will go on and 
on." We agree with Oakley, suggesting in 
our Implications and Conclusions section 
that rhe World Bank, U.N., donor nation 
and NGO endeavors might be consolidated 
under a Development Action Center, syn-
thesizing their resources to national inter-
ests. 
According to David Ahern in a journal 
of Humanitarian Deminingarticle, rhe U.N. 
has assumed rhe lead in coordinating NGO 
demining efforts with those of their own 
forces, and rhar one of their principles is rhar 
primary responsibili ty for mine action plans 
rests wirh individual stares. When rhe stare 
is inherently incapable of demining irs land 
this ability must be developed, in which case 
rhe U.N. assumes rhe responsibility of ca-
pacity building. Reviewing U.N. landmine 
policy documents, we find the United Na-
tions Mine Action Service (UN MAS) is in-
deed rhe focal point within the U.N. sys-
tem for all mine-related activities, respon-
sible for ensuring an effective, proactive and 
coordinated U.N. response to landmine 
contam ination. UNMAS is tasked with 
helping to facilitate global efforrs ar coor-
dinating mine action. Mine action strategic 
management at rhe country level, however, 
does nor appear an UNMAS function , al-
though country-level mine action strategic 
management could be inferred from 
UN MAS' holistic goals. 
Joe Lokey, arguing for comparative ad-
vantage economies, suggests rhar marching 
needs and resources and creating public-pri-
vate relationships is of paramount impor-
tance. He writes in rhe journal of Humani-
tarian Demining that rhe challenging dy-
namic of the last three to five years is rhar 
with more resources becoming available, the 
challenge has become more complex and 
difficult to manage. Few organizations and 
activities have much experience managing 
and executing mine action programs on rhe 
scale now necessary. Lokey submits that rhe 
U.N. has had a comprehensive role in at-
tempting to orchestrate g lobal demining 
and related activities. Mine action center 
management is frequently U.N.-sourced, al-
though rheir mine action center manage-
ment role has been limited by reorganiza-
tions within the U.N. demining offices, re-
source real ignments, lack of consensus by 
the demining community on rhe role of the 
U.N. , demining funds debates, ere. 
Another need for widely accepted and 
applied best management practices, accord-
ing to Lokey, is based on the potential of 
governments, NGOs, and other rel ief agen-
cies ro become overly dependent on their 
internal bureaucracies when implementing 
their mine action policies. Mine action pri-
orities are generally different among govern-
mental agencies and organizations. Bureau-
cracies, sometimes called "stovepipes," un-
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dermine the importance of reaming and 
process building or improvement and 
thwart interagency coordination and coop-
eration. The almost insidious, ever present 
"hidden agenda " must be acknowledged as 
underlying many mine action discussions 
and evaluations. 
Perhaps Lokey's most imporrant point, 
relevant to our argument for centralized 
strategic management, is that donors and 
other resourcing agencies must recognize the 
authority of rhe host nation or their desig-
nated representatives. Too frequen tly, devel-
opmental activities take on a paternal char-
acteristic that minimizes rhe role of rhe host 
nation and reduces their input into decision 
making. We suggest later in rhe article how 
host nations can achieve a mine action up-
per hand through indigenous, strategic 
management competencies, led by a profes-
sional general manager. 
In the Wintergreen Confirence Proceed-
ings Henry Thompson discusses donor in-
fluence on safety and productivity in hu-
manitarian demining, based on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina scenarios. He presents a model 
rhar involves donors early on in rhe mine 
actions processes and ries rhem to safety and 
productivity aspects rhroughour rhe mine 
action stages. While humanitarian demining 
is donor-driven at the macro level, he con-
cludes, ar rhe micro level donors have nor 
been adequately accountable for rhe effi -
ciency o r safety of their programs. We agree 
with Thompson that donors should play a 
key role in humanitarian demining and rhey 
should be more active. We're concerned, 
however, rhar the host nation must be 
equally involved in planning from the be-
ginning in forming and implementing irs 
humanitarian demining strategy. He also 
addresses rhe notion rhar demining should 
be approached under rhe overall economic 
and social development context, a provision 
we strongly concur with. 
Major Colin King, in a journal of Hu-
manitarian Demining article, suggests we 
study requirements before investing in tech-
nology. Supporting Lokey's argument for 
host nation participation in rhe mine action 
planning process, he argues that there is in-
adequate communications between the op-
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erarional and scientific communities, and 
that optimizing the process of demining re-
quires much more than rhe development 
and incorporation of high technology. It 
involves a logical and coherent approach to 
well-defined aims. 
Two other professionals we consulted 
are Donald "Par" Parierno, Director, Office 
of Humanitarian Demining Programs, U .S. 
Department of State, and Wolfgang 
Schussel, rhe Austria Vice Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister. Parierno, arguing the U.S. 
case, strongly believes char the host nation's 
demining authority, ifir exists, must rake re-
sponsibility for the management of demin-
ing programs so that mine action activities 
provide the greatest benefit to the host na-
tion. An established mine action center 
should clarify its nation's policies; enforce 
demining safety standards; and provide 
quality assurance measures. In addition, an 
established mine action center would coor-
dinate NGO and international organiza-
t ions' efforrs, helping to avoid duplication, 
reduce waste, save time and most impor-
tantly, save lives . Speaking for Austria, 
Schussel amplifies Parierno, advising that 
mine action programs must be of a compre-
hensive nature, even to the point that they 
must be seen as integral parts of comprehen-
sive reconstruction and development pro-
grams. We note that this latter point is also 
a position of the World Bank, which we dis-
cuss in our closing section. 
In addition, a strategic management 
process would help produce cost-benefit 
analyses, generally needed for nations seek-
ing demining financing. According to the 
World Bank's policy document on Mine 
Action Programmes, the high cost of financ-
ing land mine clearance activities should 
also be justified on economic grounds, tak-
ing into account the scarcity of financial 
resources. In this regard they note a signifi-
cant aspect of mine action which needs at-
tention is the integration of mine pollution 
information into the process of planning for 
other sectors in development and recon-
struction. Mine pollution affects the com-
parative expense and value of differing strat-
egies for repair of roads and infrastructure, 
rehabilitating agricultural production and 
other areas of reconstruction. Because 
demining money and development and re-
construction money have often been com-
partmentalized, trade-offs are not uniformly 
made. National leaders, in our view, should 
be able to examine all assistance initiatives 
concurrently and openly, helping prioritize 
their nation's crises from a well-informed 
knowledge base. 
One other poim we would make: Can 
the existing international political and do-
nor level of awareness be maintained? 
Patierno (in a 1999 commem in a State 
Department road show solici ting private 
money for humanitarian demining pur-
poses) warns chat donor fatigue at some 
poim is going to set in among donor na-
tions. We need to conserve and distribute 
mine action resources for the long term, an-
ticipating that public and private sector fo-
cus, awareness, and vigilance may wane over 
rime. Nurturing the humanitarian demin-
ing constituency over the long term may be 
less complicated if mine infested nations can 
presem cemralized, responsible, well man-
aged mine action centers that report incre-
mental progress on a consistent basis. 
Finally, we note a currem appalling 
situation that amplifies our plea for holistic 
strategic management. James East reports 
char mine-infested Thailand signed rhe Ot-
tawa Agreement, compelling the Thai mili-
tary to earnestly start mine removal on rhe 
Thai-Cambodian border. However, the 
agency set up to do it, the Thai Mine Ac-
tion Centre, has nor yet started conducting 
surveys to determine where the mines are. 
East quotes the Centre's frustrated assistant 
director, "we have been here for a year and 
we have not yet removed one mine" even 
though U.S. military experts trained the 
Thais in mine action when the Centre was 
established. The Centre's 150-person staff 
awaits HK$20.1 million budget approval 
from the Defense Ministry. The 99 trained 
deminers are "twiddling their thumbs in 
their barracks," according to East, despi te 
American pledges to help in financing mine 
detecting dogs, mine detectors and armor-
plated vehicles. This indicates that while 
U.S. training was successful, retraining may 
be necessary soon (demining skills tend to 
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wane if not used) due to the Mine Action 
Centre's lack of an integrated or holistic 
approach to their mine problems. 
3. The Mine Action Strategic 
Management Process Defined 
Strategic management, in our context, 
expresses a commitment to identifying, pri-
oritizing, and implementing the optimum 
mix of available mine action resources for a 
given mine-plagued nation. The key to stra-
tegic management, which is a process, is 
recognizing that the resource equation to 
address mine problems will most likely dif-
fer from one mine-infested geographic or 
political area to another. That is, mine ac-
tion resource mixes, nor constant, must be 
tailored to the environment and an evalua-
tion of rhe host nations' ability to sustain a 
long-term commitment. 
Our strategic management process 
starts with the end in mind-a host nation-
led, U.N. or NGO-supported Require-
ments Analysis of the mine-infested envi-
ronment-then works back examining all 
resources available to help achieve the host 
nation's mine action goals, irrespective of 
mine action agendas not indigenous to the host 
nation. 
The first part of strategic management 
focuses on a clear understanding of the host 
nation's vision, goals and objectives and an 
understanding of what other donors will 
bring to the table. The host nation, in de-
veloping its strategic plan with the help of 
the lead donor, selects the optimum mix of 
available mine action resources based on a 
requirements analysis of the mined environ-
ment. All components of mine action-
mine awareness, mine field assessment and 
surveys, mine and UXO clearance, victim 
assistance, and information management-
must be examined in the requirements 
analysis and reflected in the resource mix. 
The resource mix (requirements) selected 
for employment is based on host nation 
goals and objectives, and written into their 
strategic plan that details the support they 
require from donors. 
The second part of the strategic man-
agement process is implementing the stra-
tegic plan (the resource mix), through a cy-
clical process of planning, orgamzmg, 
resourcing, controlling and sustaining the 
mine action program. It's not enough to 
develop rhe optimum resource mix. To fully 
exploit it, host nations must effectively and 
efficiently manage the application of those 
resources, through a national mine action 
cemer, to achieve their mine action visions. 
We believe that obtaining or developing an 
independent, host nation-dedicated, sophis-
ticated general manager to manage the mine 
action center for the long term is as impor-
tant as developing the strategic plan. Indeed, 
it is part of it and we will address this chal-
lenge in our conclusions. 
4. Strategic Management Process 
Applied 
In this section we discuss our two-parr 
model, the strategic planning phase fol-
lowed by the implementing management 
cycle. 
Strategic Planning Phase 
We suggest host nations start by study-
ing the contaminated areas concurrently 
with establishing a mine action center or-
ganization. Typical questions that might be 
asked during the strategic planning phase 
are: Has a National Level One Survey been 
considered? What types of mines are present 
or suspected? Casualty data? What is the soi l 
content? The foliage? The culrure of the 
people in the mine pollured region? What 
is the land used for? Urgency of mine clear-
ance? Economic implications? Political con-
siderations like can the nation sustain mine 
action and is the government able to sup-
port long a long-term commitment? What 
type of equipment is employed and what is 
irs condition? 
Relative ro the mine action organiza-
tion, will the military and civilian sectors 
cooperate, with the civilian sector leading 
the policy decisions and the military imple-
menting? This is generally a condition for 
U.N., World Bank, and NGO support. 
What is the structure of their existing hu-
manitarian demining organization? What is 
their demining experience? 
Seeking an optimum resource mix for 
the country, the host nation should build a 
requirements matrix for each of the five 
components of mine action-minefield 
analysis and survey, mine awareness, mine 
and UXO clearance, victim assistance, and 
information management-for each mine-
infested region, then aggregate the data in 
a national matrix. The matrix, based on a 
Levell survey if available, will help the host 
nation decide their approach ro each mine-
infected region. 
Management Model 
Our thesis is that mine-plagued nations 
can and must manage all aspects of their 
mine action challenges-mine awareness, 
minefield assessment and surveys, mine and 
UXO clearance, victim assistance, and in-
formation management-by coordinating 
and cooperating wi th donors and other 
players in the demining industry. Only in 
this manner can they synthesize and 
synergize human, material, and funding re-
sources ro achieve timely and effective so-
lutions ro mine threats. While not advocat-
ing a one size fits all management plan, we 
challenge mine action planners to apply best 
management practices to achieve the opti-
mum use of scarce resources. We suggest a 
6-part management cycle, which we tailored 
to help mine action leaders establish a mine 
action management process. The cycle in-
volves planning, organizing, resourcing, 
controlling, and sustaining, all wired to-
gether by coordination (Figure 1). We rely 
on UNMAS for mine action organization 
terminology and standards. 
Plan 
Planning implements the strategy dis-
cussed above and starts with the general 
manager or minister-in-charge determining 
the goals (or targets) that must be achieved 
to reach the national leader's mine-free vi-
sion. Following goal establishment is defin-
ing measurable objectives necessary to 
achieve those goals. The general manager 
may next want to establish and schedule the 
activities necessary to accomplish the objec-
tives. The planning process actually starts 
while performing the Requirements Analy-
sis that indicates the resources needed to 
accomplish the mine action goals. The Re-
quirements Analysis document (we recom-
mend the matrix form) is the guide used to 
plan and schedule the objectives and events 
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leading to goal accomplishment. 
For example at our organization, U.S . 
Central Command, when we enter a nation 
that has sought U.S. mine action assistance, 
the planning matrix (similar to a schedule) 
we use is designed ro help stand up the new 
organization and reach the host nation how 
tO manage their humanitarian demining op-
erations. T he matrix we construct is rela-
tively simple, listing the activities required 
to stand-up the organization on the left side 
and dates across the top (usually in months). 
Then we start filling in what should be done 
and by whom. This approach works best 
wi th new start programs. (Once the host 
nation has the MAC and humanitarian 
demining committee operational, we work 
to support their goals and assist them with 
resolving their most significant p roblems 
through a train-the-trainer process and do-
nated material and equipment.) 
Two significant U.S.-led events occur 
during the Planning phase that might also 
serve as examples. Following the Depart-
ment of State Policy Assessment Visit, which 
determines U.S involvement in a nation's 
request for demining assistance, we begin 
developing the U.S. Humanitarian Demin-
ing Country Plan. This plan, which we draft 
in continuous coordination with the host 
nation, mine action trainers, et al., serves as 
our resourcmg strategy. 
It is written to accurately capture all 
resources and direct them toward the re-
quired support of the host nation. This plan, 
which helps eliminate redundancy, identi-
fies high-demand military training assets, 
and helps coordinate the myriad activities 
carried our by different U.S. organizations. 
It defines the host nation's mine problems 
and requirements as well as the U.S. com-
mitment. We suggest Mine Action Center 
(MAC) general manager's develop a similar 
resourcing holistic plan, in particular to 
depict resource requirements of their coun-
try, for budgeting purposes of NGOs and 
other donors. 
Organize 
Developing rhe organization to estab-
lish and support the mine action center and 
humanitarian demining committee organi-
zations will largely determine successful ex-
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 24
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol4/iss1/24
ecurion of the plan. How do we arrange ou r 
human resources to best accomplish the ob-
jectives we set our while planning? Also, de-
fining processes is extremely important-
how does work ger done at rhe national 
MAC and regional MACs? Among donors 
within the MAC? 
We recognize many aspects of"organiz-
ing." The host nation establishes their na-
tional humanitarian demining Committee, 
national MAC, and regional MACs. The 
donors and donor committee organize do-
nor support to best address host nation re-
quirements, problems and needs and the 
U.S. organizes its support to provide irs part 
of the required support. In our case we write 
and coordinate our Country Plan and en-
sure that our planned support compliments 
and synergizes rhe host nation assets and 
donor support to the host nation. If a mili-
tary-only organization exists, we will recom-
mend some sort of a civilian-led , military 
implemented hybrid organization that all 
donors can support. 
If some sort of donor organization is 
nor in place, we attempt to organize one to 
faci li tate future support and to better coor-
dinate efforts. Parr of our Requi rements 
Determi nation Sire Sur vey (actually a re-
quirements analysis) is designed to deter-
mine who is doing what in the host nation, 
who has the lead , and where the U.S. firs in 
the big picture (our aim is a viable self-suf-
ficient program.) This also includes helping 
organize donor support to the host nation. 
Resource 
Resourcing provides funding and per-
sonnel to support the MAC and RMACs 
and should be coordinated while develop-
ing a Coun try Plan. Based on the Require-
ments Analysis, all aspects of the mine ac-
tion p rogram must be considered in the re-
source plan, providing donor organizations 
not al ready part of the nation's demining 
plans an opportunity to fill in needed fund-
ing or resource gaps. 
At U.S. Central Command, we start 
resource planning in earnest during the Re-
quirements Determination Sire Survey 
while we're conferri ng with the host nation 
and NGOs interested in helping the host 
na tion. We then draft the U .S Country 
Plan, staff it with all interested agencies in-
cluding the host nation, then brief the co-
ordinated draft plan to host nation repre-
sentatives, U.S. humanitarian demining 
program managers and force providers 
(trainers) for approval. The briefing is con-
d ucted at what is called a Resource Alloca-
tion Planning Meeting. The end resu lt is a 
resourcing plan (the Country Plan) that is, 
again , technically approved by the multiple 
humanitarian demining organizations and 
the host nation (although not yet signed). 
The agreed upon plan is then signed by the 
U.S. Ambassador to the host nation and 
sent ro the decision authority within the 
U.S. government to provide resources. U.S. 
resources are approved th rough the Inter-
agency Working Group, which represents 
upper-level decision-makers from several 
U.S. Government agencies. In the event that 
approved resources are less than required, 
the plan is reworked to account for short-
ages and coordinated once more with all 
involved agencies supporting humanitarian 
demining, including especially the host na-
tion, to help eliminate shortfalls. 
Control 
We would caution general managers 
regarding establishing control measures for 
demining operations. Evidence suggests that 
control systems produce rwo kinds of in-
valid data: invalid data about what can be 
done and invalid data about what has been 
done. Military deminers, perhaps unsophis-
ticated in the role of accurate data, may wish 
to please their organizations more than re-
porting data accurately. Q uality Assurance 
management (systemic qual ity) should be 
practiced through rigorous demining train-
ing and strictly enforced safety practices. 
Q uality Assu rance, in addition to Measures 
of E ffectiveness, are techniques we would 
recommend host nations establish for con-
trolling quality and reporting progress, thus 
helping ensure effective and consistent U.S. 
and other donor support. Regarding the 
importance of reporting progress, we reit-
erate here the necessity of M ine Action Cen-
ters reporting incrememal progress on a 
consistent basis. 
In general, the U.S. does not attempt 
to control the host nation mine action pro-
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gram. Accounting procedures are estab-
lished and cover everything from account-
ing for equipment to the quality of the in-
struction being conducted in any of the el-
ements of mine action. Measures of Effec-
tiveness (MOEs) are established for measur-
ing rwo things - how well the host nation 
is conducting humanitarian demining and 
how well the U.S. support is assisting the 
host nation. These MOEs are often d iffer-
ent from the host nation's or other donor's 
Measures of Effectiveness. The general man-
ager must gather the appropriate informa-
tion to assess MOEs and adjust his program 
as necessary to sustain and improve U.S. and 
other donor support. 
Sustain 
We repeat Patierno's warning that do-
nor fatigue at some point is going to set in 
among donor nations. General manager's 
need to conserve and distribute mine act ion 
resources for the long term, anticipating that 
public and p rivate sector focus, awaren ess, 
and vigi lance may wane over time. 
In th is phase, the U.S. focus changes 
from intensive, daily support of the new 
organization to maintaining, consulting and 
looking more long term for new technolo-
gies and techniques that m ight help speed 
efficiency and improve safety for the host 
nation. Our presence is scaled back to 30-
45 days per quarter, usually focused on spe-
cific elements of mine action such as mine 
awareness. For example, our mine action as-
sistance program consists of a fo rmal annual 
visit called the Requirements and Verifica-
tion Visit specifically designed to review and 
update the host nation's humanitarian 
demining requirements, what the other do-
nors are doing, and the n verifying that 
equipment previously donated is being used 
properly and effectively. Obviously, we 
spend considerable time in the hosr nation 
throughout the year bur the Requirements 
Analysis Verification Visit is conducted to 
work with the highest levels of the host na-
tion government and to ensure the host 
nation understands we hold them respon-
sible for the supplies and equipment pro-
vided. The results of the Requirements 
Analysis Verification Visit are then used to 
update the Country Plan, changing or 
Mine Action Strategic Management Process figure 1 tions-may be the general managers' great-
est challenge. 
• MAC, RMAC-Ievel 
• Implements National Strategy 
• Goals and Objectives 
• U.S. RO SS event, Country 
Plan started 
-----...... 
S. Conclusions and Implications 
a. While we suggest that strategic plan-
ning for mine action is distinct from man-
agement planning, in practice management 
leaders generally combine the functions-
thus, the Strategy would be developed in the 
Planning phase of the management cycle. 
We made the distinction to emphasize the 
importance of determ ining a country's to-
tal m ine action requirements before 
Coordination • Formalize p lan 
contemplating resources, which most 
countries tend not to do. Our Strat egic 
Management logic would also apply to 
countries that decide to outsource thei r 
• Donors integrated 
• Processes defined 
• Importance can't be overstated 
• Involves all players 
• U.S. PD SS event• Synergize MAC mine actio n operations. Host nations 
should lead the Requirements Analysis 
phase and provide a general manager to lead 
their Mine Action Centers. Host nations 
would do well to advertise their general 
management needs to international man-
agement consultant firms. The investment 
• Synthesize resources 
• U.S. RAPM 
Control 
• 
Donor committee established 
• QA first, QC second 
• U.N. safety standards 
• MOE fo r country, donors 
modifying U.S. support ro the 
host nation in light of the status of 
their goals and objectives as well as 
what other donors intend to provide. O ur 
Country Plans cover rwo years and are co-
ordinated with all agencies associated with 
humanitarian demining in the host nation 
(including the host nation). U.S. Country 
Plans are posted on the web at www. 
centcom.mil. 
Coordination 
In our view, coordinatio n in mine ac-
tion is continuously communicating within 
and among all p layers associated with the 
host nation's mine action program, to in-
clude players who may have a contribution 
bur are unaware of it. Reinforcing the ho-
listic approach, coordination starts from day 
one an d never stops- it is the key to effi-
ciency and success. Coord ination brings the 
p layers ro the table to ach ieve the host 
Figure 1 
• ROSS is Requirements Determination Site Survey 
• PD SS is Pre-deployment Sire Survey 
• RAPM is Resource Allocation Planning Meeting 
• RAW is Requirements and Verification Visit 
nation's demining vision and helps 
break down bureaucratic "stove-
pipe
s." 
Coordination is central to the 
five management steps discussed 
above. In situations where there are compet-
ing desires and agendas between donors and 
the host nation, vigorous and open coordi-
nation is absolutely critical. 
In our program, the establishment of a 
formal donor committee and good lines of 
communication with rhe host nation is es-
sential. The donor committee must be 
chaired by an organizatio n that can help 
ensure all donations support the host nation 
with minimal redundancy o r waste. The 
donor committee provides the forum for co-
ordinating donor p lans and de-conflicting 
resource arguments. Coordination is rhe key 
to success! Managing coordination within 
the MAC- indeed, ach ieving a degree of 
cooperation among the mine action func-
• 7 1 • 
in an exceptional general manager, beholden 
only to the host nation government, should 
achieve significant returns on the invest-
ment, in terms of humanitarian and re-
source allocation outcomes. 
b. T he implications of well planned 
and host nation-managed mine action pro-
grams are considerable, including serving 
the host nations' political, economic, as well 
as mine action agendas. Arnold Sierra, a 
Foreign Service Officer currently engaged at 
the U.S. Star e Department's Humanitarian 
Demining Program, suggests that host 
nation's consider an umbrella Development 
Action Center (DAC), which would inte-
grate mine action and national development 
and reconstruction act ivities, supporting 
self-determination goals. A donor support 
methodology could be established with in 
the DAC to help eliminate waste, synergize 
donor support, and coordinate activities by 
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the many different donor agencies involved. 
We note that as a development agency the 
World Bank supports member country pro-
grams rhat help lead ro rhe eradication of 
poverty and to the promotion of sustainable 
development. Its support of mine acrion is 
based upon the recognition rhat mine pol-
lution is, for many affected countries, a sig-
nifi cant obstacle to the reestablishment of 
normal development activities. In this con-
text, it shares with UNDP a perspective 
which views mine pollution as a develop-
ment problem with long term consequences 
and, necessari ly, with long-term solutions 
which extend far beyond initial humanitar-
ian concerns. Also important is that the 
Bank shares responsibility with UNDP for 
convening donor groups in reconstruction 
situations and thus has a major role in re-
source mobilization and in setting long term 
agendas for international support for mine 
action and other needs. Similar to UNDP 
mine action policies, land mine clearance in 
Bank-financed projects must be carried out 
under the auspices of civilian authorities, an 
incentive for civil ian-led national Mine Ac-
tion Committees, setting policy for Mine 
Action Centers. 
c. Impl ications for continuous Quality 
Assurance, not necessarily Quality Control, 
are significant. While Quality Control ar the 
demining unit level is necessary and impor-
tant, Quality Assurance, systemically man-
aged by the general manager, is equally im-
portant. Assuring that training and safety 
systems are well designed, properly taught 
and rigorously enforced is a function of the 
general manager, not off-handedly delegated 
to subordinates. In addi tion, iris the respon-
sibility of the general manager to establish 
Measures of Effectiveness for his Mine Ac-
tion Center, which tell his boss or the Prime 
Minister how the mine action program is 
progressing. Donors will also need data for 
their own agendas, which the general man-
ager must accommodate if he expects con-
tinuous donor support. Having established 
its own Measures of Effectiveness, the U.S. 
will assist general manager's in establishing 
data collection methods to meet their (and 
other donors') data needs. The point is that 
general managers need to realize the impor-
tance of regularly reponing mine action data 
to donors, helping ensure their long-term 
support. 
d. As we suggest throughout this ar-
ticle, our research and experience indicates 
that worldwide mine action remains frag-
mented and uncoord inated. Holistic na-
tional approaches to their mine action prob-
lems would appear to help sustain stable and 
generous donor support. Regarding compe-
tition for demining resources, holistic ap-
proaches may tend w prioritize donor sup-
porr w regions enduring the most human 
suffering, rather than those with rhe most 
political influence. 
An Application of Strategic 
Management and Lessons Learned 
In the June edition of journaL of Mine 
Action the authors will demonstrate their 
strategy and management model through a 
fi ctiona l nation that contains many of the 
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mine action problems in existence today. 
They wi ll also present an organizational 
model and several of the lessons they learned 
during t heir experience in Horn of Africa 
and Middle East mine afflicted countries. 
• 
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destructive testing, signal/image processing, remote 
sensing, Geographic Information Systems and medi-
cal imaging. 
Existing vs. new technologies 
Several national demining campaign sponsors 
brought up rhat less emphasis should be put on de-
velopment of new technologies. The "improvement 
of existing technology will resolve rhe problem faster." 
Some prefer an imperfect technique whose limitations 
are well-known as compared w a new technique rhat 
is not yet trusted. The need for complete solutions, 
raking into account all aspects was stressed by many 
NGOs - Mine Action is indeed nor only about 
demining. 
(Global) R&D trends 
Much of the R&D effort for hu manita rian 
demining has gone toward the detection of individual 
mines. Two approaches seem to be the most predomi-
nant: rhe use of a multi-sensor system, or the combi-
nation of a detection sensor. Some research is cur-
rently done on wide-area confi rmat ion methods. Air-
borne mine field delineation or explosive vapor/trace 
detection ro complement-or partially replace-
dogs, in order to save precious rime by concentrat-
ing on areas which really need to be demined. Evo-
lution should be governed by a set of keywords 
(NPA): "Safer, Faster and Cheaper." 
Sensor technology maturity 
Consider: we have to rely on indirect evidence 
due to the absence of well-established definitions of 
equipment performance; most of the results of inde-
pendent performance tests are not publicly ava ilable; 
we have not conducted performance tests ourselves; 
and we do not share the practical experience of 
deminers working in the field. We nevertheless think 
rhat Table 2 is useful in fixing the large tendencies in 
technology maturity and equipment cost. 
Airborne mine field detection/remote sensing 
The role of remote sensing vs. ground-based 
methods has not yet been fu lly identified. For air-
borne mine-field detection on realistic surfaces (I 00-
to 1000-km2), terabytes (1000 gigabytes) of digital 
data have to be analyzed. Setting-up a measurement 
campaign is a complex and expensive operation. Al-
though for civilian applications on-board processing 
might not be a primary requirement, even off-line 
analysis requires huge computing fitc ilities. The de-
velopment of remote sensing systems has been pri-
marily done in the military context and iris unlikely 
char these systems will be operational for civilian ap-
plications in the near fu ture. Several platforms have 
been tested, like airships, aircrafrs, drones and heli-
copters. The privileged sensors are the optical and the 
IR imager, although UWB-SAR seems to yield prom-
ising results for the future. On certain soil types and 
non-densely vegetated areas the airborne mine field 
delineation results are reported to be successful (e.g. 
deserts). 
Testing and evaluation 
The implementation of specifications for resting 
protocols is again an international miss ion. T he ex-
istence of several ad hoc protocols is a well-known 
fact after this survey, but they remain proprietary 
information, which is inaccessible for th e research 
community. In order to rest or compare new tech-
nologies that are in the development phase or have 
been developed, a possibil ity should exist to gain con-
fidence by application in the field. The establishment 
of a joint working group, focusing on rhe develop-
ment of testing methodologies and the design of stan-
dards for sensor and system assessment, is currently 
ongoing. On the European side, the existing Com-
mittee of Advisors: Detection of Mines based on 
Operational Standards (CADMOS) workgroup, pro-
moted by JRC, acts as the core group. 
EUDEM started in December 1998 and ended 
in July 1999. The survey was conducted by EPFL 
(Ecole Polyrechnique Federate de Lausanne) and 
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel). It was funded by 
EU; DG XIII. • 
Contact Information 
Karin De Bruyn, Claudio Bruschini, Hichem Sahli, 
Jan Cornelis 
VUB-ETRO, Department "El ectronics and 
Information Processing" 
Pleinlaan 2, B-1 050 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel. +32 (0)2 629 2930 
Fax +32 (0)2 629 2883 
E-mail: kdebruyn@vub.ac.be 
• 73 . 
4
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 24
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol4/iss1/24
